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court tersely stated that the sentence lacked
any indicia that the higher sum would be
awarded.
-- -- The court substantiated their construction of the statute by examining the legislative history behind 36-308. The court
found the following reasons to include the
80% provision in the statute: (1) cost saving; (2) prevention of disability recipients'
receipt of more after tax income than if
they worked; and (3) the preservation of
the work incentive. Report of the D. C. City
Council Committee on Housing and Economic Development on Bill 3-106, 01/08/80,
pp. 4, 16-17. The court concluded that the
petitioners failed to demonstrate why these
goals were not attained by applying the
80% provision to them and others in their
disability categories.
The McDaniel court clarifies the meaning of36-308. It is now clear that claimants
are entitled to the lesser of 80% of their
spendable earnings or 66 213% of their average weekly wage. The court's strict interpretation of 36-308 narrows the avenue
of statutory attack available to workers'
compensation claimants. Future attack on
36-308 will be best pursued through the
legislative process.
-Avery Berdit

Staley 'D. Board of Education of
Washington County: ATTORNEY'S
FEES ALLOWED EVEN THOUGH
AMOUNT PAID IN WORKERS'
COMPENSATION CLAIM
EXCEEDED TOTAL SUM DUE
UNDER A MODIFIED AWARD.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Staley v. Board of Education of Washington
County, 308 Md. 42, 517 A.2d 349 (1986)
held that an employer and its insurer
were required to pay legal fees to a workers' compensation claimant's attorney even
though the amount already paid to the
claimant exceeded the total amount due
under a modified award. In so holding, the
court of appeals reversed the court of special appeals and affirmed the circuit court
ruling.
Claimant Joy M. Renehan Staley, a
school teacher, fractured her hip in the
course of her employment. The Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) determined that Ms. Staley suffered
a 55% permanent partial disability and
set compensation benefits accordingly.
Ms. Staley's employer and the insurer appealed the Commission's order to the Circuit Court of Maryland for Washington
County. There the circuit court deter24- The Law Forum/Winter, 1987

mined that the Commission had erred and
ruled that Ms. Staley suffered only a 35%
permanent partial disability. The court
therein modified her award commensurately.
While the appeal to the circuit court was
in progress, the employer had been paying
disability benefits at the rate set for 55%
disability. By the time Ms. Staley's award
was modified by the circuit court, the accumulated amount already paid to her was
$9,000 higher than the total modified
amount. In addition, claimant's attorney
had properly filed for, and had been approved by the Commission, attorney's fees
at an amount commensurate to the 55%
disability rate. When the claimant's disability award was modified, claimant's
attorney filed a new petition and the Commission reduced the attorney's fees commensurate to the modified award. Both
Commission approvals called for the attorney's fees to be paid out of the final
weeks of claimant's disability payments.
When Ms. Staley's attorney was not paid
his legal fees, he first filed issues with the
Commission to require the employer to
pay the awarded attorney's fees. After the
attorney (again) was found to be entitled to
his fees Ms. Staley's employer appealed
this order to the circuit court where the
Commission's decision was upheld. The
employer then appealed to the court of
special appeals. The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court basing their
decision on their belief that there were no
reserve funds remaining for the benefit of
the attorney. The court of appeals then
granted certiorari.
In analyzing the issue herein, the court
of appeals looked to two specific statutes
under Maryland law. Judge Couch, writing
for the majority, concluded that under
Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 57 (1985) and
COMAR 14.19.01.21F(Rule21 F), when
attorney's fees are approved by the Commission, a lien is placed upon the compensation award in the amount approved.
When a fee petition is filed by an attorney,
the employer and its insurer are put on notice, and must put in escrow, the amount
requested in the petition until the Commission approves the fee request. See
Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 57 (1985) and
COMAR 14.09.01.21F. The escrow account and the lien on the funds therein remain in existence until the attorney receives his due compensation. 308 Md. at
48, 517 A.2d at 352, citing Hoffman v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 232
Md. 51, 55-56, 191 A.2d 575, 577-79
(1962).
After looking at the two statutes, the
court concluded that on the date of filing
of the attorney's fee petition, the employer

and its insurer were put on notice to segregate the amount requested from claimant's
award and place it into escrow. Once the
attorney's fees were approved by the Commission, the lien on that approved amount
materialized. The escrow amount and the
lien were not extinguished when the circuit court modified claimant's award. The
only effect of the Commission's subsequent
modified fee award was to change the sum
held in escrow to the modified amount. Id.
at 49, 517 A.2d at 352.
The court herein made it clear that this
procedure for attorney's fees is followed
even in the event that there is an overpayment in compensation. The court relied
on the reasoning in Hoffman, supra. There,
the Commission awarded compensation that
was subsequently reduced on appeal. As in
the case herein, the total modified award
was less than what the insurer had already
paid out. But in Hoffman, money had been
put in escrow to satisfy attorney's fees. The
insurer therein refused to pay attorney's
fees arguing that when the court reduced
the award, there was no money left upon
which a lien could attach. In rejecting the
insurer's contention, the court of appeals
therein wrote that "an insurance carrier
cannot defeat an attorney's statutory lien
by applying funds held in escrow to satisfy
an overpayment to a claimant." Hoffman,
232 Md. at 55-56, 191 A.2d at 587 .. Judge
Couch concluded that Hoffman applies
equally as well in this case.
The court in Staley also analyzed the
court of special appeals' rationale for their
reversal. The court of special appeals reasoned that funds for satisfaction of attorney's fees were accumulated only from
the final weeks of compensation due a
claimant. Because there was an overpayment here, the appellees were no longer
able to reserve funds to pay the attorney.
The court of appeals rejected this rationale
on two grounds. First, the lower court's
reasoning ignores the "clear requirement
of Rule 21 F that compensation funds must
be placed in an escrow account no later
than at the time the attorney files his fee
petition. It is simply incorrect to conclude
that the escrow account remains empty until one reaches the final weeks of compensation." 308 Md. at 51,517 A.2d at 353.
Second, and "more fundamentally," Judge
Couch argued, "the intermediate appellate
court's approach would encourage those in
appellee's position to postpone establishing an escrow account and placing compensation funds therein until after an
appeal of the claimant's award has been
decided." Id. at 52, 517 A.2d at 353-54.
The court herein was quick to point out
that this decision is in no way inconsistent
with Feissner v. Prince George's County,

282 Md. 413, 384 A.2d 742 (1978). In
Feissner, liability of the employer and its
insurer was simultaneously discharged under a statutory offset provision when the
claimant received superior benefits from a
government pension plan. This discharge
occurred before the attorney had filed a fee
petition. However, in the case herein as
well as in Hoffman, the appellee's liability
was not discharged. The attorney's lien
"subsequently did attach to a portion
thereof, obligating the appellees to pay
claimant's attorney." Id. at 53, 517 A.2d
at 354.
The court in Staley has clarified any ambiguity that may have existed concerning
the procedures to follow for attorney fees
stemming from workers' compensation
cases. It is clear that the court here has
rightfully placed the interests of the compensation claimant ahead of governmental
bureaucracy.
- Christopher Hale

Dade County School Board v. Polite:
FLORIDA ACCEPTS THE
PREMISES EXCEPTION TO THE
GOING AND COMING RULE FOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS.
In Dade County School Board v. Polite,
495 So.2d 795 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1986), the
District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the Deputy Commissioner's determination that a teacher's injuries were
compensable in that they arose out of and
in the course of employment. The District
Court of Appeal of Florida also held that
the teacher was not precluded from receiving benefits by the rule that an employee
going and coming from work is normally
considered outside the scope of his employment, thereby recognizing the premises
exception.
In Dade County, a physical education
teacher, Ms. Cheryl Polite, was injured
when her automobile was struck by a hitand-run driver after she had left a track
meet. At the time of the accident she was
returning the track equipment to the school
from which she had borrowed it. Polite
was employed by the Dade County School
Board as a physical education teacher.
Polite taught at North Glade Elementary
School in the morning and at Lake Stevens
Elementary School in the afternoon, five
days a week. Although her workday officially ended at 3:05 p.m. daily, Polite participated in after-school activities which
were officially encouraged and reflected in
a positive fashion on teacher evaluations.
Throughout Polite's employment she had

consistently participated in extracurricular activities with which the Dade County
School Board had knowledge of and given
its approval.
On the day of the accident, a track meet
involving students from Polite's morning
school, North Glade, was held at Skylake
Elementary School in the afternoon. Polite
was to teach physical education at Lake
Stevens Elementary School that afternoon,
but, on this day the Lake Stevens' students
were released from school at 1:45 p.m.
Nevetheless, Polite was required to remain
until 3:05 p.m. Polite then requested and
was granted permission to leave Lake
Stevens earlier than 3:05 p.m. Before leaving Polite collected some of Lake Stevens'
track equipment which she knew might be
needed at the track meet. Because she felt
that the equipment might be needed the following day by Lake Stevens' instructors,
Polite intended to return the equipment
immediately following the track meet.
Ms. Polite went to the track meet and assisted at the starting line. She left Skylake
before 4:00 p.m. traveling the only road
leading away from the school en route to
Lake Stevens to return the track equipment. While on the road, Polite's automobile was struck in the rear by a hit-andrun driver, causing injury to her back, foot,
right knee and right hand.
Appellants Dade County School District
and their insurer, Gallagher Bassett Insurance Service, argued that Polite's claims
for medical expenses should be denied because of the "going and coming rule." In
the alternative, the appellants argued that
Polite's injuries were not compensable because attendance at the meet was not in the
course of her employment because there

was no requirement that she attend. The
Deputy Commissioner in determining that
the injuries were compensable held that
the "after hours teacher participation was
expected and considered in performance
evaluations." 495 So.2d at 797. The Deputy Commissioner further held that Ms.
Polite was not precluded from benefits by
the going and coming rule because she
was not traveling to her home, but was
en route back to Lake Stevens to return the
track equipment. Therefore, the commissioner determined that the injuries arose
out of and in the course of Polite's employment, thereby allowing the medical benefits sought and not precluding them by the
going and coming rule. Id. at 797.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida,
in affirming the Deputy Commissioner's
determinations, stated that the encouragement and reward by way of positive performance teacher evaluations was "competent" and "substantial evidence" to show
Polite was in the course of her employment. Id. at 797. Further support for the
court's holding was found in the fact that
Polite "did not merely elect to attend" the
after school activity since the activity was
related to her field of expertise. The court
also found other evidence from which it
could have been reasonably inferred that
"Polite arrived and assisted at the meet at
least partially during her regular working
hours, since she sought and obtained official permission to leave her afternoon assignment early in order to attend." Id.
In affirming the commissioner's decision
that medical benefits are not precluded by
the "going and coming rule," the court first
stated the general proposition expounded
in Stacy v. Cherry Farms, Inc., 449 So.2d
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